Dipali Mukhopadhyay (Author), (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 388 pages, $20.15, ISBN: 978-1-107-02392-5
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“Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan” was written by Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Assistant Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, and explores how some of the warlords in Afghanistan turned into political representatives of central government after 2001. Though warlords are often considered as threats to the stability of a country, the central government of Kabul engaged some of them to establish a strong administration beyond the capital of Kabul and manage the periphery. The author argues that under some specific conditions, some of these warlords turned into effective actors on behalf of the Kabul regime.
Dipali claims that strongmen who had local competitors allied with central government to take advantage of their formal position and the governmental resources in order to empower themselves. She explores two case studies of the Balkh governor Atta Mohammad Noor and Nangarhar governor Gul Agha Sherzai to prove this argument. Both of these two strongmen had local rivals and became strong governors after obtaining official positions. The selection of these two strongmen as provincial governors was beneficial for both the government and the governors; the government selected them to manage the wild periphery while the strongmen working on behalf of the government gained advantages over their local competitors. As a result, they turned from ‘strongmen’ into ‘strongmen governors’.
In other cases, Dipali argues that when a strongman has no local rivals, he will act more according to his own will rather than the interests of central government. This can be observed in the case of the governor of Herat province, Ismail Khan, who faced no credible competition and remained too strong to need a relationship with the central government. Therefore, he “stood to lose power as a result of formal appointment”. Furthermore, when a weak warlord faces local competition, he would remain overly dependent on the central government and would not be able to act effectively. Juma Khan Hamdard, a strongman appointed as governor of Baghlan (then Jawizjan), is an example of this case.
Dipali’s rich description of her case studies provides strong support for her thesis. For her first case study she turns to the city of Mazar-e Sharif after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, which had turned into a field of competition between Atta, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and lesser extent commander Mohammad Mohaqqeq. Atta was strong in terms of military; he had 7,000 armed militiamen in 2004, and this number raised to 10,000 in Balkh and about 50,000 in other parts of northern Afghanistan. Economically, he had several sources of income: the border crossing of Uzbekistan and Kod-e-Barq Factory were under his control, which had a monthly income of $540,000 in 2002. Also, it’s said that he gained further income from drug trafficking. In addition, he was receiving money from Ahmad Shah Masoud, Tajikistan, Iran, India, and then from US troops. On the other hand, Atta was supported in material and political terms by the Defense Minister, Marshal Fahim, and the Minister of Interior Affairs, Younis Qanooni, both Tajiks and members of the Jamiat party who had control of the country’s army and police. In addition, Karzai and two other high-ranking officials strongly disliked Dostum and used Atta as a tool to weaken him.
Atta’s military, economic, and sociopolitical power led him to obtain the governorship of Balkh province in the summer of 2004. He served of the central government with pleasure, because his formal position enabled him to enhance his informal power. He hired commanders of the Jamiat party as key persons in the security institutions of Balkh. He divided lands among his commanders and monopolized development projects in the area. Moreover, Atta awarded con-tracts for most of the construction projects in the area to his own two companies, Khalid Noor Company Limited (Balkh’s largest construction company) and Uhm-al-Balad Noor or other companies close to him. Other companies simply didn’t even submit proposals as they thought that the governor’s companies would be the winner. The town of Khalid-bin-Walid is an example of governor Atta’s investments in Balkh. At the same time, the governor served according to interests of central government, transferring considerable sums of local revenue to Kabul, while also providing security and eliminating poppy cultivation in Balkh.
Gul Agha Sherzai, a Pashtun strongman, was appointed as a governor in Nangarhar province. Before his arrival in Nangarhar, the province was subject to competition among local commanders and insurgents from the Jabbarkhel, Pashaei, and Khogyani tribes. Sherzai was also strong in terms of military, eco-nomic, and sociopolitical connections. He had close relationships with the U.S. forces and a mutually beneficial relationship with president Karzai when he was in Kandahar. His income from dealing with Americans amounted to an estimated $1.5 million per month, in addition to his other income sources. Even some American officials estimated Sherzai’s income at $300 million while he was in Kandahar.
Gul Agha Sherzai obtained a formal position as governor of Nangarhar in 2005. Kandahari Sherzai was an outsider relying on the central government to take the control of the province due to his lack of pre-existing power in Nangarhar. To do so, he established a military commission; the army, police, and security forces were working separately and reporting to him. He had different strategies to manage the local competitions, such as appointing some of mujahidin commanders as district governors and offering advantages to tribal elders. He offered gifts and even money to tribal elders to keep their support. In return, they helped him fight against cultivation of poppies in the province. It’s also said that he established ties with Taliban sympathizers, the Pakistani consulate in Nangarhar, and the ISI to spread his political influence. Some Nangarharis claimed that the governor established close ties “to Taliban sympathizers and elements within the Pakistani regime as part of his strategy for managing violence”. Governor Sherzai also took advantages of development projects and collected illegal taxes from the Torkham gate. Most of the PRT projects were implemented by the governor’s company, Jamal Baba Construction Co. Like Atta, he also helped the government in terms of fighting against poppy cultivation and providing relative security in Nangarhar and transferred local revenue to the central government.
In addition to the case studies of Atta and Sherzai, Dipali studied Ismail Khan and Juma Khan Hamdar, two other strongmen who served as provincial governors after 2001. Ismail Khan, the “too strong Emir of Herat”, took over the ruling infrastructure in Herat province before the new Afghanistan government was stablished in 2001. Khan’s preexisting monopolized military forces in He-rat enabled him to take control of Herat after 2001. In 2002, the number of his militia was estimated between 25,000 to 60,000, so he could easily surpass or defeat his competitors. Khan was supported by Iran, who protected him and invested in him as its main ally in Afghanistan. Iran “gave Ismail’s forces an opportunity to regroup, grow, and train.” According to Dipali, Iran helped the governor of Herat financially, politically and militarily.
He started eliminating his political competitors in Herat. In 2003, the Unity (Hazara) Party (Hezb-e Wahdat) protested against monopolizing the administration. Months later, two Hazara representatives who had criticized Ismail Khan were killed by unknown assailants, according to the Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch also reported discrimination against Pashtuns. A clash occurred between Ismail Khan and a Pashtun commander, Karim Khan, resulting in 50 deaths. The media were not able to criticize him as strictly censored them. And in terms of the economy, he monopolized custom revenue from cross-border trade estimated at $300,000 per day in 2002 that reached $600,000 – $1 million later that year. The New York Times estimated his income at $400 million a year in 2003. He didn’t transfer this money to the central government. Since Iranian support made him so strong, he didn’t feel the need to work with and stay close to the Kabul regime. Therefore, the government considered him as a threat instead of partner and replaced him.
Juma Khan Hamdard, a relatively weak Pashtun warlord in northern Afghanistan, served as provincial governor in Baghlan and Jawizjan provinces. He was a member of Hezb-e Islami, and was also aligned with the Taliban terrorists and then with Dostum. Despite his previous ties with the Taliban, Dostum helped him re-establish his power in the north in 2002. He was appointed as governor in Baghlan in 2005. However, due to his lack of ability, he couldn’t work effectively on behalf of the national government. Months after his appointment, hundreds of people marched in Baghlan carrying signs saying we “don’t want an illiterate governor, but a cultural and educated governor”. Because of “the absence of sufficient pre-existing strength (military, financial and socio-political)”, he was replaced in September 2005. He was then appointed in Jawizjan. It’s said that his appointment as governor of Jawizjan was also part of Karzai’s plan to weaken Dostum in the north. Juma Khan was unable to control that province as well. He was accused of working only for Pashtuns and ignoring members of other ethnic groups. He faced a big demonstration in Jawizjan as well, with a clash between protestors and government police. The police fired and killed some of the protestors, which made them even angrier. Finally, he lost his position in Jawizjan as well. Karzai appointed him as a governor in Paktia.
The research was conducted using interview, mostly in an open ended format. This approach likely led to some problems. As a foreigner, the researcher is not familiar with the context of the society and even doesn’t know the language of the interviewees. Furthermore, she has used snowball sampling for interviews with the residents, which creates a problem with selecting research participants. The first contact/s may refer the researcher to others who share the same ethnic background or political views for interviewing, which could lead to bias; this effect is especially pronounced when it comes to sensitive subjects like political conflicts among local competitors. As Browne says, “the ‘more sensitive or threatening the phenomenon under study’ the more difficult sampling will be” (2005).
Therefore, the data might not be entirely accurate in some respects because ethnicity would play an important factor in her snowball sampling and significantly affect the information reported to her. As Siddique (2012) says, “At the dawn of 21st century, the conflict in Afghanistan was seen above all as an ethnic struggle”. In such context, informants would be likely to offer skewed information to avoid speaking negatively about leaders from their own ethnic group, or conversely, would keen to criticize their ethnic rivals. For instance, the author mentioned that people of different political and ethnical backgrounds participated in the administration in Balkh province, while Atta has been criticized for failing to comply with ethnic composition regulations in key positions of Balkh. The participants would not tell the ugly truths because they would think of their ethnicity dignity. In security institutions, there is only one Hazara in key position (Mitra TV, 2016; Atta Facebook Page, 2016) while the Hazaras form 43% percent of Mazar-e Sharif’s population. This might has happened in the rest of data related to Sherzai as well.
Another point to remember is that Dipali argues strongmen were turned into strongmen governors due to the central government’s support alongside local competitors and pre-existing informal power. For instance, Atta was a strongman who had the support of the central government and sufficient informal power. However, Atta turned to opposition to Karzai regime after the 2009 presidential election and their previous relationship went sour. Also, he backed the current president’s competitor in the 2014 election; but after 7 years, he is still the strongman governor of Balkh with his previous authority and increasing his informal power. Dipali’s thesis would have been stronger if she had explored more recent developments involving these strongmen and their relationship with the new regime.
It would have been good if Dipali had explained what she meant when she labeled some of these men “effective political representatives of the state” or an “effective provincial governor.” If the term “effective governor” refers to one who had good governance, fought against corruption, and worked for social and economic development, there is a need to reconsider Atta and Sherzai as “effective governors” because they are accused of corruption, illegal trade, land mafia, and discrimination against people from different political and ethnical backgrounds. For instance, the author describes that, Sherzai has collected illegal taxes from trucks related to traders at Torkham Gate. Traders had declared that “the tax rate had been between $100 and $120 per truck until a recent de-crease to a rate of $40 to $60, interpreted as a nod to calls from Kabul to eliminate corruption”. The author quoted the estimation made by the Washington Post showing “an average of 600 to 800 tractor-trailers moved through Torkham a day”, meaning the estimated income from Torkham Gate totals around $100,000 per-day. Also, a NATO security report declares that Atta uses “his patronage network to assassinate and harass political opponents, Atta has at-tempted to further strengthen his political position. Moreover, the relationship with criminals, especially drug traffickers, has likely been profitable and contributed to Gov. Atta’s financial resources (qtd. in Human Rights Watch, 2015).
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References:
- Browne, K. (2005). Snowball sampling: using social networks to research non‐heterosexual women. International Journal of Social Research Methodology,8(1), 47-60.
- Siddique, A. (2012). Afghanistan’s Ethnic Divides. CIDOB Policy Research Project Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspective. On-line text, dostupný z www:< http://www. observatori. org/paises/pais_87/documentos/ABUBAKAR_SIDDIQUE. pdf>, ověřeno ke dni, 26(12), 2012.
- Mitra TV, Published on Mar 31, 2016. Link: www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmWKqwfusF8&feature=youtu.be
- Atta Mohammad Noor Facebook Page; March 31, 2016
- Human Rights Watch (2015). “Today We Shall All Die”: Afghanistan’s Strongmen and the Legacy of Impunity. United States.
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The article was published on The Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies (JCACS)